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AL VIN I. SMITH, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
11598 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This action was brought to recover on a non-
negotiable promissory note signed by the defendant, 
Alvin I. Smith, Attorney, while he was representing 
a client in negotiations with respect to a real estate 
transaction in Arizona. 
The defense is that no cause of action has yet 
accrued since the conditions expressly stated in the 
non-negotiable note have not yet occurred. The note 
provides: "It is understood and agreed that the draw-
er of this note shall not be liable hereunder until and 
unless payment is received from Clifford R. Walker 
on notes executed by him in the total sum of $13,-
977. 70". 
'The plaintiff pleads a second claim based on al-
legations that the defendant failed to take action re--
quired to recover on the two notes payable to the de-
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fendant the collection of which was a condition pre-
cedent to the plaintiff's right to recovery. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court granted judgment for the 
plaintiff for the amount of the note, interest and at-
torney's fees. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and 
judgment in his favor as a matter of law, or that 
failing, a new trial. 
While it may not be within the issues in this case, 
in order to avoid further litigation, this defendant 
would consent to an order of this court to assign to 
the plaintiff an interest in the Walker notes or the 
judgment now entered against C. R. Walker to the 
full extent of the amount which has now accrued on 
the note held by the plaintiff. This would permit the 
plaintiff to directly move aga:inst C. R. Walker on 
that judgment if the plaintiff feels that he could ef-
fect recovery from C. R. Walker more expeditiously 
than the defendant and his counsel have been able to. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was brought against the defendant 
on a non-negotiable promissory note which contains 
this clause: 
"It is understood and agreed that the 
drawer of this note shall not be liable hereun-
der until and unless payment is received 
Clifford R. Walker on notes executed by him 
in the total sum of $13,977.70". 
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This note was signed in conjunction with two 
real estate transactions in which the Coronado Land 
Company, a partnership, was involved. The plaintiff 
is one of the partners of Coronado Land Company. 
(Tr. 50, L. 10) 
Prior to January 15, 1962, Coronado Land Com-
pany, a partnership, of which plaintiff was a mem-
ber was negotiating with one Clifford R. Walker for 
an exchange of two apartment houses in Phoenix, one 
of which was known as the Pharoah Apartments for 
some acreage in Arizona. Before that transaction 
could be completed, Walker was obliged to provide 
funds to cover delinquent mortgage payments and 
delinquent taxes on the Pharoah Apartments. The 
detail of that encumbrance is here set forth: 
Property Taxes ______________________ $5,240.81 
Interest ------------------------------------ 60.68 
General Property Taxes 
and interest _______________________ _ 5,301.49 
Special Assessments ______________ 380.01 
Interest ------------------------------------ 4.50 
Total Special Assessments 
and interest ________________________ 384.51 
Total Taxes and Interest ______ 5,686.00 
Mortgage delinquency and 
interest amounting to ________ 8,286.21 
Additional interest accrued 
before date of payment ______ 5.49 
Total mortgage delinquency 
including interest ______________ 8,291.70 
Total obligation to 
C. R. Walker ---------------------- $ 13,977.70 
Walker was not in funds to clear these obliga-
tions and the partnership of Coronado requested this 
defendant, then negotiating on behalf of his client, 
Stoller, with Coronado for the acquisition of the Pha-
roah Apartments, to determine whether Smith could 
arrange to provide the funds for Walker to cover the 
$13,977.70 on condition that Coronado would take 
one-half of the risk. On these terms Smith agreed 
with Coronado to have client Stoller make a loan of 
$13,977.70 to Walker. The seller suggested that the 
defendant act as intermediary (Tr. 55, L. 15-30) 
to disburse the $13,977.70 and then to receive pay-
ment on these promissory notes for monies advanced 
by his client and from the money so to be received that 
he pay over one-half thereof to his client, the buyer, 
and the other one-half to the seller of the property, 
the Seller's one-half being represented by the note 
herein sued upon. Smith was to receive $13,977.70 
from his client Stoller and disburse the $13,977.70 
paying $8,291. 70 directly to the mortgagee and $5,-
686.00 to the County for Taxes. In order to divide the 
risk equally between Stoller (Smith's client) and 
Coronado, Coronado on January 15, 1962 agreed it 
would accept a note for the $6,988.85 balance of the 
purchase price, exactly one-half of the $13,977.70 
payable when Sm'ith collected $13,977.70 from Walk-
er. (Tr. 52, L. 6 to Tr. 53, L. 23) 
Q And did your client, Mrs. Stoller, advance 
that amount of thirteen thousand, some 
odd dollars, to pay these delinquent items? 
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A She did. 
Q And that was done so the property would 
be clear when a trade was made with Stol-
lers for the Pharoah Apartments? 
MR. FRAZIER: We object to that as leading 
and suggestive. 
THE COURT: It is that. 
MR. ARNOVITZ: Well, I can rephrase it. 
THE COURT: All right. Let him answer. It is 
leading. 
A Under another agreement between Coro-
nado and Cerene and Walker, Coronado 
had agreed to cause to be loaned to Cerene 
and Walker the thirteen thousands dollars 
in order to clear this up so the transaction 
could be made, and Cornado then asked me 
to have my client loan the money, and the 
money was so loaned, and Walker then 
gave those notes. 
Q (By Mr. Arnovitz) And what relationship 
did the amount of the note given to Mr. 
Skousen, or to the Coronado Land Com-
pany have to the total of these two notes? 
THE COURT: Well, it is half. 
MR. ARN OVITZ: Yes, rt is exactly one-half, 
but we wanted to show the reason for it, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
A Under the purchase - under the purchase 
agreement which you have had marked as 
Exhibit-
THE COURT: '''D-5." 
A (Continuing) "D-5" $23,000.00 was the 
purchase price to be paid by Stoller to Cor-
5 
onado. The purchase price was to be paid at 
the - May I have the exhibit to refresh my 
memory as to the amount? The purchase 
price was to be paid according to the 
agreement made with Coronado by the pay-
ment of cash of $16,011.15, and I was in-
structed by Coronado to deliver a note for 
$6,988.85 to Skousen, which that was one-
half, the agreement being with Coronado 
that although Stoller would advance the 
full amount that the risk would be on Cor-
onado to guarantee all amounts paid out 
over and above $23,000.00, so that Mrs. 
Stoller was to receive $6,988.85, at which 
time the balance would go to Skousen, and 
thereby the purchase price of $23,000.00 
would have been paid. 
Q In other words, adding to the $16,011.15 
the $6,988.85 note would have made up the 
total purchase price of $23,000.00? 
A Yes. Now, as this whole agreement as to 
the purchase price was completed, an agree-
ment made with Coronado as a partnership 
and as the owner, we were instructed by 
them whom the note was to be paid to and 
how it was to be handled there. 
On the following day on behalf of his client, 
Smith agreed to purchase the Pharoah Apartments 
for the sum of $23,000.00 subject to the foregoing 
encumbrances of $13,977.70 knowing that he already 
had in his hands the $13,977.70 for which Walker had 
executed the two notes with which to remove these 
encumbrances. Since the Coronado Land Company 
had agreed to accept one-half of the risk of the loan 
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to vValker, the method adopted to have them take the 
risk was to defer payment of $6,988.85 of the pur-
chase price until such time as Walker paid the two 
notes. 
The Coronado Land Company, a partnership, 
directed that the note for this amount be made pay-
able to one of the partners, Jerry Skousen, the plain-
tiff herein. (Tr. 53, L. 19-23) This note is dated 
February 1, 1962, fifteen days after the dates of the 
two Walker notes and is made payable fifteen days 
after the date it was expected that the money would 
be received on the two Walker notes. This fifteen day 
interval between the date Walker was to pay the two 
notes amounting to $13,977.70 and the date when 
Smith would then have been obligated to pay the note 
of $6,988.85 to this plaintiff would have been suffi-
cient time to have prevented any default by Smith in 
the payment of this note to the plaintiff. 
The Walker notes were not paid on their due 
date of January 15, 1964. Beginning in January, 
1964 Smith gave Walker notice that the two notes 
were coming due. (Tr. 35). When payment by Walk-
er was not forthcoming, Smith contacted Walker. 
Walker was a resident of Calgary, Alberta, Canada. 
In April, 1964, Walker was in Salt Lake City to at-
tend the Conference of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints and Smith located him in Salt Lake 
City and made demand upon him for payment of the 
two notes. Walker promised to make payment. When 
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Walker returned to Calgary, sometime after April, 
1964, he sent a payment of $2,500.00 to apply on one 
of the notes and it was so applied. 
Q Was the $2,500.00 credited to one of those 
notes? (Tr. 35, L.1-2) 
A It was. 
Walker also had agreed to make further pay. 
ments of $2,500.00 per month until the total of $13,-
977. 70 plus interest was paid. After April, 1964 when 
no further payments were being received, Smith con-
tinually attempted to pressure Walker into making 
these payments. (Tr. 37) Smith had a difficult time 
to con tact Walker in Calgary and Smith knew that 
he usually came to Conference in Salt Lake City twice 
a year and when he was unable to contact Walker 
here, he hired private detectives to check the hotels to 
see if he could find him in order to serve him with 
summons and sue on the notes, but he was unable to 
trace him down in Salt Lake City. Smith went to Cal-
gary in the Fall of 1966 and spent a day trying to find 
Walker in Calgary. (Tr. 37) Smith found his office 
closed and no one answered at Walker's home in Cal-
gary. Smith went through Calgary again a week later 
and was unable to contact him. After Smith returned 
to Salt Lake City, in November, 1966 he requested 
Irwin Arnovitz, his associate, to take whatever steps 
were necessary to effect recovery of the Walker notes. 
Irwin Arnovitz, referred the matter to Calgary coun-
sel and Mr. Smith made an advance of $200.00 in 




sel in Calgary then advised that Walker could not be 
located in Calgary and that Walker was probably in 
Utah. Smith then tried to locate Walker in Utah; 
Smith had met Walker's father-in-law, President 
Tanner, and had his secretary call Mrs. Tanner to 
find out where her daughter and son-in-law (\Valk-
er) were living and Mrs. Tanner gave her an address 
in Orem, Utah. Soon after that an action was started 
on the two Walker notes. Smith talked to Walker 
shortly afterward and Walker told him that summons 
had been served on him just ten days after he came 
back to Orem. 
The suit against Walker was commenced in the 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in and 
for Utah County, Case #31235 on September 12, 
1967. During the pendency of the suit, negotiations 
were carried on with Walker in an effort to collect 
these notes. Exhibit R3. Walker agreed with Smith 
that he would contact Mr. Frazier, Skousen's attor-
ney and pay him the amount of the Skousen note and 
would obtain from Frazier a dismissal with prejudice 
of this suit and agreed to pay Smith the amount due 
to his client but after first paying Skousen. Smith 
agreed that Walker could pay Skousen before paying 
him but unfortunately Walker has paid neither one. 
Counsel for Smith attempted to obtain some security 
from Walker which could be applied to the payment 
of both Walker notes and received an assignment of 
some funds alleged to be due to Walker from the Ban-
ner Corporation and on which there was some expec-
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tation that there would be paid to Walker a rather 
large sum. (Ex. D-4) When the assignment was ex-
on May 10, 1968 and the assignment was ac-
cepted by the Banner Corporation on May 16, 1968, 
it was expected that Walker's one-third interest 
would exceed $100,000.00 and that the $13,977.70 
would be paid in full. Like many such transactions, 
the payment of $100,000.00 did not materialize and 
indeed no sum was paid over by the Banner Corpor-
ation for the benefit of Walker or for the payment of 
the amount due to Mr. Smith's client. Because of this 
inability to force Walker to pay the $13,977.70, Smith 
was unable to fulfill the obligation which he had gra-
tui tiously undertaken and for which he received no 
benefit of any kind but has suffered the burden of 
attempting to collect the Walker notes, has expended 
his money to pay court costs in Canada and in Utah 
and has suffered the burden of defending this action. 
Mr. Frazier, counsel for the plaintiff, examined Mr. 
Smith as to why he had signed this promissory note. 
(Tr. 55, L. 14) CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. FRAZIER: 
Q Mr. Smith, how come you happened to sign 
this promissory note? 
A I was acting as an intermediary for the 
parties because my client did not want to 
be - She didn't know all of the details of 
this. I was merely a nominee, part of collec-
tion and the paying out, acting between as 
a negotiator and the intermediary between 
Coronado, Walker and Stoller. 
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MR. FRAZIER: I have no further questions. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ARNOVITZ: 
A Now, as a matter of fact you have never 
had any financial interest in this person-
ally at all? 
THE COURT: You are not claiming anything. 
This is in your answer. 
MR. ARNOVITZ: No, we don't, but just for 
the purpose of the record, counsel has just 
opened that matter up, and I want to amplify 
it. 
Q (By Mr. Arnovitz) You have had no finan-
cial interest in this transaction, and none 
of the proceeds would come to you in any 
way? 
A In no way. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NO CAUSE OF ACTION HAD ACCRUED TO 
THE PLAINTIFF ON THE NOTE HEREIN 
SUED UPON AND THE COURT SH 0 UL D 
HAVE GRANTED DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR DISMISSAL AND NON-SUIT. 
This point was raised by the defendant at the 
very outset of the trial. The execution of the note 
having been admitted, the court suggested that the 
burden to go forward would be on the defendant but 
the defendant raised the point: "That there is no lia-
bility under the note unless and until the two notes 
executed by C. R. Walker are paid in the total amount 
of $13,977.70". Counsel for the defendant then con-
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tinued (Tr. 28) - '''It seems to me that it is incum-
bent upon them first to show that such amount has 
been paid; if that amount hasn't been paid there is 
no claim accrued as yet" - Plain tiff's counsel then 
agreed that he had the burden of establishing the 
facts to show that the note had become payable and 
that a cause of action had accrued. (Tr. 28 and 29) 
The execution of the note was admitted by the 
defendant as was the fact that the defendant has 
received one payment of $2,500.00 on one of the notes. 
(Tr. 34, L. 17 Tr. 35, L. 2) 
A I received $2,500.00 on one of the notes. 
Q When did you receive that payment? 
A I believe it was in April of '62, or what is 
the date of the note? 
THE COURT: February 1st. 
THE WITNESS: Of what year? 
THE COURT: 1962. 
THE WITNESS: I mean April of 1964. 
Q (By Mr. Frazier) You received $2,500.00 
from Mr. Walker in payment on one of his 
notes? 
A Yes. 
Q How many notes were there comprising the 
$13,000.00 as alleged or set forth on that 
prom'issory note? 
A Two notes. 
Q And was the $2,500.00 credited to one of 
those notes? 
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A It was. 
The plaintiff offered no other evidence as to the 
time when the note became payable nor any evidence 
to explain the ambiguity in the note. Thus on a Mo-
tion for non-suit, the District Court had only the four 
corners of the note and the single fact that one pay-
ment of $2,500.00 had been made on one of the notes 
in April, 1964 from wltich the court could find that 
the note had become payable before this suit was com-
menced. 
The clause in the note as to the time payable 
reads: 
'"It is understood and agreed that the 
drawer or this note shall not be liable hereun-
der until and unless payment is received from 
Clifford R. Walker on notes executed by him 
in the total sum of $13,977.70". 
'The plaintiff's contention must be that the note 
became payable in April, 1964 when the one payment 
of $2,500.00 was received on one of the notes. The 
condition in the note is - "payment-on notes-in 
the total sum of $13,977.70". The meaning of the 
phrase becomes clear and obvious when the phrases 
in this clause of the note are put in their proper gram-
matical sequence. When that is done, the clause reads 
without inserting a single letter or word as follows: 
"It is understood and agreed that the drawer of this 
note shall not become liable hereunder until and un-
less payment is received in the total sum of $13,977.70 
from Clifford R. Walker on notes executed by him". 
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Likewise, the clause is crystal clear, when the 
letter "n" in the word "on" is changed to the letter 
"f" so that the clause as so changed would read: 
"It is understood and agreed that the 
drawer of this note shall not be liable hereun-
der until and unless payment is received from 
Clifford R. Walker of notes executed by him 
in the total sum of $13,977. 70". 
Counsel for the plaintiff is asking the court to 
read the clause as though the article "a" preceded the 
word "payment". However, no evidence was offered 
to that effect and on the contrary the plaintiff testi-
fied that what he had requested Smith to do was to 
collect the notes that were due from Mr. Walker and 
not merely to obtain a payment from Mr. Walker so 
that his note would become payable. (Tr. 31, L. 26 
to Tr. 32, L. 1) Had any such evidence been offered 
defendant has in its possession a letter written by the 
plaintiff to Mr. Frazier his attorney, a copy of which 
he mailed to the defendant in which he acknowledged 
that the note in suit did not become payable until full 
payment of the two Walker notes. That evidence 
would have been offered in rebuttal, if plaintiff had 
given any testimony that there was an agreement 
that the note should be 'interpreted as though it read, 
"a payment". We attach that letter as an appendix to 
this Brief. 
From the following question of counsel for the 
plaintiff, we have an indication that he interpreted 
the Skousen note as providing that it did not become 
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payable until Smith collected the two notes from 
Walker. 
Question by Mr. Frazier: Did you have 
any conversation with Mr. Smith specifically 
about taking action against Mr. Walker in 
collecting the notes that were due from Mr. 
Walker? 
A. Yes. I felt my security was being im-
paired. I had numerous conversations with him 
asking him to proceed and get this collected. 
(Emphasis ours) (Counsel is of the opinion 
that the word '"this" should be "these") (Tr. 
31-32) 
Accordingly, it seems clear that the plaintiff 
knew that this note was not payable until and unless 
the notes executed by Walker in the total sum of $13,-
977. 70 were collected - not partly collected. 
The answer given by the plaintiff likewise sug-
gests the same thing, when the plaintiff used the 
word "security". There is nothing in the note to Skou-
sen stating it is a secured note, as indeed it is not. 
What Skousen must have meant by the use of the 
word "security" was that whatever funds he was to 
receive in payment of his note would have their origin 
in the collection of the two Walker notes. 
The District Oourt ascribed a meaning to the 
word "payment" that does not conform to either the 
dictionary or legal definition of that word. No evi-
dence was offered that the word "payment" was to 
have a meaning different from its dictionary or legal 
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meaning. Webster's Imperial Dictionary defines pay-
ment as: 
"The thing given in discharge of a debt 
or fulfillment of a promise". 
The same dictionary defines the word '''pay" as fol-
lows: 
"To get rid of or satisfy as a debt, duty, or 
obligation, by performing an action required 
or by delivery of something or some amount in 
satisfaction; to satisfy ones debts, duties or 
obligations". 
A partial amount paid on an obligation is not "pay-
ment" but one installment of a given number of in-
stallments that may be required to make payment of 
an obligation. The word "payment" does not require 
the addition of any word or article to be correctly un-
derstood. Definitions of the word "payment" as they 
appear in Vol. 31-A, Words & Phrases a:t page 216, 
217, 233 and 234 follow: 
Page 216 - ''Payment" meant in full and not 
in part or a compromise for a part. in re Thorn-
wall's ES'tate, 10 N.W. 2d 35, 233 Iowa 626. 
"Payment" of an obligation connotes ful-
fillment of it according to its terms. Stone vs. 
Webster, 144 P.2d 466, 468, 65 Idaho 392. 
Page 217 - "Payment" of a debt is made by 
debtor's delivery to creditor of money or some 
other valuable thing, and creditor's receipt 
thereof, for purpose of extinguishing debt. 
Moses vs. United States, D.C.N.Y., 28 F. Supp. 
817, 818. 
Page 233 - "Payment signifies the discharge 
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of a debt, obligation of duty. In re Gray's 
Estate, 290 NYS 603, 607, 160 Misc. 710. 
'"Payment" implies satisfaction or dis-
charge of an indebtedness or claim. Dennett 
vs. Goelet, 256 NYS. 393, 395, 143 Misc. 195. 
"Payment" implies discharge of an obli-
gation according to its terms or by something 
given or received of agreed value equal to the 
debt or liability. Crutchfield vs. & 
Latimer, 8 So. 2d 412, 414, 243 Ala. 73. 
"Payment" is a mode of extinguishing a 
debt. Bradford vs. Richard, 16 So. 487, 489, 
46 La. Ann. 1530. 
Page 234 - "Payment 'is generally understood 
as a discharge of the debt or obligation by a 
compliance with the terms of the obligation, 
and, if the obligation calls for a money dis-
charge, then there cannot be payment except 
by paying the full amount called for in money, 
or the representative of money. Casper vs. 
Mayer, 43 P. 2d 467, 472, 171 Okl. 457 - cit-
ing Continental Gin vs. Arnold, 52 Okla. 569, 
153 P. 160, 2. 
The word "payment", which is not a tech-
nical term, means the discharge in money or 
its equivalent of a debt or obligation or the 
actual or constructive delivery by a debtor to 
his creditor or money or its equivalent with 
intent to thereby extinguish the debt, and ac-
ceptance thereof by creditor with same intent. 
Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, Ind. Revenue 
Bd., Ind. Gross Income Tax Division vs. Col-
paert Realty Corp., 109 N.E. 2d 415, 419, 231 
Ind. 463. 
The word '"payment" has a specified and 
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clear meaning, which is that a claim has been 
paid. Readings vs. M cM enmnin, Del., 39 A. 
463, 464, 1 Pennewill, 15. 
Thus if we substitute for the word "payment" 
its legal definition, the clause would then have this 
meaning: "It is understood and agreed that Smith 
shall not be liable hereunder until and unless funds 
discharging or extinquishing notes executed by C. R. 
"\Valker in the total sum of $13,977.70 are received 
by Smith". 
How incongruous it would be to believe that a 
clause would be placed in a note to defer the accrual 
of a cause of action on a note to a time when "a pay-
ment" would be received on a note amounting to $13,-
977. 70. Thus the condition of the note could be met 
by making a nominal payment of $1.00 or $100.00. 
Under the ruling of the District Court if "\Valker had 
paid Smith $100.00 on the $13,977.70 note then Smith 
became immediately liable to pay and discharge the 
Walker note. The intermediary would then be put 
in the untenable position of being forced to pay the 
note and interest amounting in all to approxima:tely 
$8,000.00 when he would have collected only $100.00. 
The fifteen day interval between the maturity 
date of the Walker notes, January 15, 1964 and Feb-
ruary 1, 1964 the original maturity date of the note 
in question, conclusively shows that it was the full 
payment of the Walker note that was the condition 
required before plaintiff's note was to be paid on Feb-
ruary 1, 1964. Tha;t was the source of funds that the 
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"intermediary" Smith expected to apply to the pay-
ment of the Skousen note. It was never intended that 
Smith should pay this note out of his funds, but it was 
clear tha:t it was the intention that the source of funds 
that the intermediary Smith was to apply to the pay-
ment of this note was the monies to be received from 
Walker. This becomes ever clearer when it is noted 
that the real esta:te transaction was closed on January 
16, 1962. This note, a part of that transaction, was 
deliberately dated fifteen days after the transaction 
was closed. 
The furthest limit to which the plaintiff would 
testify as what facts there were to show that the note 
was payable at the time of the commencement of this 
action is this statement: ''When I was informed that 
Mr. Walker had paid him $2,500.00, then I felt that 
my obligation should be satisfied". (Tr. 32, L. 9-11) 
(Emphasis ours) The plaintiff did not testify that 
there was any conversation at the time of the execu-
tion of the note to the effect that his note would be-
come payable when $2,500.00 was paid on one of the 
Walker notes. Again it is clear, that the plaintiff 
knew that this note was not payable unless and until 
the full amount of the two Walker notes were collect-
ed. 
Weight must be given to the use of the words 
"total sum". The New Century Dictionary, Vol. 2, 
published 1942 by D. Appleton - Century Co. de-
fines the word "total" as "the total amount, sum or 
aggregate (as, add the several times to find the to-
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tal) ; "all", "whole", '·'entire"; "constituting or com-
prising the whole", "entire (as the total amount ex-
pended"). 
Similarly, the words "unless" and "until", the 
dictionary cited above states that the word "unless" 
is generally followed by a ''specification of some con-
dition". The condition here is that Smith has no lia-
bility unless payment is received in the total sum of 
$13,977.70 discharging in full the two notes of C.R. 
Walker. 
It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff 
presented no evidence whatever to the effect that the 
note became payable prior to the commencement of 
this action and that defendant's motion for a non-suit 
and a dismissal should have been granted. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED ANY 
FACTS 'TO SUSTAIN 'THE SECOND CLAIM 
The intermediary Smith was diligent in his ef-
forts to collect the Walker notes. The statement of 
facts relates the activities of Smith in trying to col-
lect the Walker notes. They reach all the way from 
constant pressure on Walker to pay the notes to hav-
ing a detective try to locate Walker, to himself trying 
to locate Walker in Calgary, to calling Walker's mo-
ther-in-law in Salt Lake for information as to his 
whereabouts, to advancing $200.00 of his own money 
to sue Walker, to having his associate file a suit when 
Walker was finally located. Smith never asked Skou-
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sen to participate in the expenses of suitor to advance 
attorney's fees or to pay for the private detective. 
Smith did all this without Skousen in a sincere effort 
to collect the Walker notes. Paraphrasing, if he was 
not a gratuitous bailee, he certainly was a "gratuitous 
intermediary". There is no evidence that there was 
any time after January 15, 1964, that the notes owing 
by could have been collected with or without 
suit. There is no evidence of any negligence on the 
part of Smith and no evidence of any damage to Skou-
sen. Damages could have resulted to Skousen only if 
it could have been shown that between January 15, 
1964 and September 12, 1967 a judgment against 
Walker could have been collected. The evidence is 
clear that when suit was brought and judgment en-
tered that Smith's counsel, who obtained the judg-
ment against Walker, has not been able to satisfy 
that judgment. 
POINT III 
THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S SEC-
OND CLAIM CONSTITUTE AN ACKNOW-
LEDGEMENT THAT PLAIN TI F F KNEW 
THAT HIS NOTE WAS NOT PAYABLE UNTIL 
SMITH COLLECTED THE TWO WALKE R 
NOTES. 
The allegations in Paragraph 1 of plaintiff's 
Second Cause of Action give the plaintiff's interpre-
tation of the conditional clause in the note: 
"That in addition to the allegations set 
forth in the First Cause of Action, Defendant 
has failed, neglected, and refused, and does 
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now fail, neglect or r e f u s e to take action 
against Clifford R. Walker on the promissory 
note which the Defendant holds against Clif-
ford R. Walker; and as a result, the defendant 
is attempting to postpone the time of payment 
on his own promissory note to the plaintiff and 
that the defendant is guilty of laches, has not 
acted in good faith, and has prevented the 
plaintiff from collecting on his promissory 
note because of the misconduct and failures of 
the Defendant." 
Plaintiff there interprets the conditional clause 
as allowing the defendant to postpone the time of pay-
ment of the note, something which defendant could 
do only by failing to collect the note. Therefore, plain-
tiff acknowledges that the collection of the Walker 
notes is a con di ti on precedent to the liability of the 
defendant on the note in suit. Plaintiff further al-
leges the defendant has not acted in good faith in fail-
ing to file suit against Walker. Th'is makes it clear 
that the plaintiff wanted an action to be brought 
against Walker for the recovery of $13,977.70 be-
cause he knew that Smith would not become liable 
until collection of this amount was made. The allega-
tion that Smith has prevented the plaintiff from col-
lecting on this note is to the same effect. The only 
way Smith could prevent Skousen from collecting on 
his note was to refuse to collect from Walker. Again 
this is an acknowledgement that Smith does not be-
come liable to Skousen until he collected the two 
Walker notes. See -3 Corbin on Cntracts, Page 42: 
"We must observe on the other hand that 
22 
if the second party knows the meaning that the 
first party intended to convey by his words, 
then he is himself bound by that meaning of the 
words. The same is true if he had reason to 
know what the first party intended." 
See also 3 Corbin on Contracts, Page 44: 
"How is a court to find out whether either 
party knew or had reason to know the intent 
or understanding of the other? Knowledge of 
such a factor may be proved by any evidence 
that is ordinarily admitted to prove a state of 
mind. This would include the party's own ad-
missions, his actions from which knowledge 
may be inferred, testimony of statements and 
information given him from which knowledge 
may reasonably be inf erred, and the usages 
and meanings of third persons with which he 
probably was familiar. The fact that one had 
'reason to know' is some evidence that he did 
know; but is far from conclusive". 
'"The court will not interpret the words of 
an agreement so as to hold one party bound in 
accordance with the wholly unexpressed inten-
tions and meanings and understandings of the 
other. A contractor is bound in accordance with 
the meaning that he induces another to under-
stand and act upon, if he knows or has reason 
to know that the other will so understand and 
act. And in determining whether or not he has 
reason to know, the court should be advised of 
all the surrounding circumstances ; of the 
meaning that is given to the language of the 
agreement by the parties; of communications 
between the parties during preliminary nego-
tiations and during the execution of the writ-
ing; and of subsequent interpretations and 
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practical applicatwn by either party that is 
assented to or acted upon by the other." (Em 
phasis ours) 
PONIT IV 
THE PLAINTIFF'S FAIL URE TO OFFER ANY 
EVIDENCE THAT THE INTERPRETATION 
OF THE NOTE AS TO WHEN DEFENDANT 
BECOMES LIABLE UNDER IT WAS DIFFER-
ENT FROM THE EVIDENCE OF THE DEFEN-
DANT MAKES IT NECESSARY FOR THE DIS-
TRICT COURT TO FIND IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT 
The defendant testified as to the facts and cir-
cumstances at the time of the delivery of the note that 
the meaning of the allegedly ambiguous phrase is 
that the maker is not to be liable on the note until and 
unless he received payment of the total sum of $13,-
977.70 on two notes executed by Walker. The payee 
of the note produced no evidence of a different inter-
pretation and, therefore, the interpretation of the 
maker of the note is the only possible interpretation 
to be adopted by the court. See - Clark vs. State 
Street Trust Company, 169 N.E. 897, 270 Mass. 140, 
ref erred to in Note 40 of 3 Corbin on Contracts, Page 
38: 
"'The aim of all interpretation of writings 
is to ascertain the meaning intended 'to be at-
tached to the words by the parties who used 
them, and to effectuate the true purpose of the 
parties as there ascertained. All rules are an-
cillary to that dominating one". 
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POINT V 
THERE IS NO FINDING THAT THE NOTE 
SIGNED BY THE DEFENDANT WAS PAY-
ABLE AT THE TIME OF THE COMMENCE-
MENT OF THIS ACTION. 
Finding of Fact #2 states that the note was 
payable within two years provided the drawer of the 
note had received payments on promissory notes 
which the defendant held on C. R. Walker. There is 
no evidence that the defendant had received payments 
on the notes "within two years after the date of the 
note." The note is dated February 1, 1962 and for 
any payment to have been received within two years 
from date, the payment would have had to have been 
made before February 1, 1964. The only payment 
was in April, 1964. Accordingly, under this Finding 
of Fact, the note was not payable and the defendant 
had no liability thereunder at the time of the com-
mencement of this action. 
Finding of Fact #3 signed on March 9, 1969 re-
cites that the note is now past due and payable. There 
is not a finding that the note was payable at the time 
of the commencement of the action. Since there is no 
finding that this note was payable when the action 
was commenced, there is no basis for the Conclusion 
of Law that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment. 
POINT VI 
FINDING OF FACT No. 4 WHICH FINDS THAT 
THE DEFENDANT HAS RECEIVED IN EX-
CESS OF $2,500.00 IN PAYMENTS ON NOTES 
IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE IN THREE 
PARTICULARS. 
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1. There was only one payment. 
2. There was a payment on only one note. 
3. The payment was $2,500.00 and not in ex-
cess of $2,500.00. 
The Finding that there was a payment on notes 
is prejudicial since such finding would indicate that 
one of the conditions precedent to the note becoming 
payable had been met. The condition precedent re-
quired payment of both notes. 
POINT VII 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT DO NOT SUSTAIN 
A JUDGMENT ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE 
PLAINTIFF. 
One of the facts essential to the entry of judg-
ment is a finding that the conditions in the note mak-
ing the defendant liable on the note have occurred. As 
referred to above, one of the conditions required to 
make the defendant liable was that collection had 
been made on notes executed by Walker. There is no 
finding that collection of $13,977.70 was made on 
notes signed by Walker. There is no finding that the 
note in question was payable at the time of the com-
mencement of the action. 
POINT VIII 
FINDING OF FACT No. 4 IN PART IS CON-
TRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND IN PART IS 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. THUS 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE 'TO SUS'TAIN 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CLAIM. 
We are of the opinion that reasonable action was 
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taken by the defendant in his efforts to collect the 
notes from Walker. There is no need to repeat the 
evidence in the record. The defendant recited the ac-
tion taken by him in his efforts to collect the notes in 
response to plaintiff's counsels questions as follows: 
Question by Frazier: '"In between the time the 
notes were executed and the time the action was filed 
against you, what a c t i o n, if any, had you taken 
against Mr. Walker to collect on the promissory notes 
you held from him"? Smith recited what action he 
had taken, see Tr. 35, 36, 37, 39 and 40. 
The second clause of the Findings of Fact on 
plaintiff's Second Claim reads: ''Because of the 
Statute of Limitations and the possibility of plaintiff 
losing his cause of action on the promissory note, his 
action would appear to have been appropriately tak-
en". The Court made a finding with reference to the 
Statute of Limitations although the court had sus-
tained an objection to the question inquiring whether 
the plaintiff had become concerned about the Statute 
of Limitations. (Tr. 31, L. 19-26). Therefore, there 
is no evidence in the record that would sustain the 
Conclusion of Law which was included as a part of 
the Findings of Fact i.e. that "his action would ap-
pear to have been appropriately taken". Moreover, 
the evidence as to the action taken by Smith to collect 
the note referred to immediately above, clearly dem-
onstrates that such conclusion of law is unwarranted. 
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CONCLUSION 
Counsel for defendant is of the opinion that 
plaintiff has not stated a claim against the defendant 
- that the evidence of the plaintiff does not establish 
a claim and that the defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
should have been granted. Counsel for defendant 
urges this court to reverse the judgment and enter 
an order that defendant had no liability on the note 
in question at the time of the commencement of this 
action. 
Defendant restatees his offer to assign to the 
plaintiff an interest in the judgment tha:t has been 
entered against Walker to the full extent of the 
amount that has accrued to date on the note held by 
the plaintiff. Defendant would go further and even 
assign the entire Walker judgment to the plaintiff if 
plaintiff would now agree to act as intermediary and 
pay over to the defendant any excess over the amount 
that has accrued on plaintiff's note, if and when full 
collection is made from Walker. 
In such event, defendant's counsel would con-
tinue to give all possible assistance to collect the 
Walker notes. Defendant makes this offer with the 
consent of his client. Defendant has acted diligently 
as intermediary and with his client's consent will 
even go to this extent to assist the plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
IRWIN AR'.NOVITZ 
1309 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for 
Defendant and Awellant 
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Mr. Leon Frazier 
Attorney-at-Law 




March 6, 1968 
I had a telephone conversation, day before 
terday, with Cliff Walker whereby he asked me if 
something could be worked out with he and Alvin 
Smith to bring this matter to a satisfactory conclu-
sion. I told Mr. Walker that I was agreeable to any-
thing as long as my position was made secure and that 
I would receive the money as promised. 
Mr. Walker also told me that he was going to be 
required to give a deposi'tion regarding this note and 
that this deposition was for the sum and sole purpose 
of stating that the Twenty-five Hundred Dollars, re-
ceived and acknowledged, was not applied against the 
subject Thirteen Thousand and Nine Hundred and 
Seventy-seven Dollars and Seventy Cents note from 
Walker to Smith, made as a condition in the promis-
sory note in the amount of Six Thousand and Nine 
Hundred and Eighty-eight Dollars and Thirty-five 
Cents, on the date of February 1, 1962, from Alvin 
to me. 
I wish to go on record to you and to all concerned 
that I have several letters in my file from Cliff Walk-
er stating that he had paid and applied Twenty-five 
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Hundred Dollars on this said obligation and that the 
balance would be forthcoming, to Alvin, in the very 
nea1· future so that I would receive the balance of my 
money. Also Alvin Smith acknowledged to me that 
he had received Twenty-five Hundred Dollars from 
Cliff Walker on ths obligation. However, regardless 
of the circumstances prevailing, I would be most hap-
py to come to Salt Lake City and sit down with you 
and Alvin and Cliff Walker, if I can be of assistance 
in bringing this matter to a sa:tisfactory conclusion 
and get it dismissed from the courts. 
I think Mr. Walker will recall one instance in 
my office when he admitted to me in front of other 
witnesses that he had paid Twenty-five Hundred Dol-
lars on this obliga:tion. At that time he was in route to 
Mexico and I advanced him Three Hundred Dollars 
from my personal account, check number 2515, to 
cover his expenses into Mexico. 
Hoping this information clarifies the situation. 
JS:go 
CC : Mrs. Alvin Smith 
Mr. C.R. Walker 
Sincerely, 
Jerry Skousen 
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